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GORMAN v. ST. PAUL INS. CO.
usual that the devisee has no knowledge of the testa-
mentary act, and to cast upon him the burden of showing
under what circumstances the will was made would place
upon him a burden he could not possibly discharge. This
reasoning is quite in accord with the prevailing view,33 for
it seems concerned only with a situation lacking the ele-
ments necessary to constitute a suspicious circumstance. 4
Thus the creation of a rule which would shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the proponent of the
will, when evidence is presented which sufficiently reveals
the existence of suspicious circumstances, would in no way
be a deviation from the basic rule which distinguishes testa-
mentary gifts from the doctrine of equitable confidential
relations as applicable to inter vivos gifts.
35
BERT AM M. GOLDSTEIN
Torts - Charitable Immunity As A Screen
To Insurer's Liability
Gorman v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co.'
The plaintiff's wife, while a patient in Suburban Hos-
pital in Montgomery County, was injured through the
negligence of a nurse. The plaintiff brought an action
against the Hospital alleging the above facts and claiming
$150,000.00 damages. The hospital filed a general issue plea
and a special plea that it was an eleemosynary institution
and hence immune from liability. Thereupon, the plaintiff
brought suit against the insurance company, alleging that
the Hospital was insured in the amount of $100,000.00
against liability for negligence. The policy was required
by statute to contain a provision to the effect that the in-
surer shall be estopped from asserting the defense of the
insured that it is immune from liability on the ground that
hardship since he would only be required to make an explanation within
his knowledge. Such reasoning could easily be extended to a situation in
which the beneficiary of a will had actively participated in the making of
testamentary disposition. In this instance also the proponent would only
be made to explain that which was within his knowledge.
94 C. J. S. Wills 1085, Sec. 237.
In re'Kirby's Appeal, 8upra, n. 31.
a' See also, the more recent case of Murray v. Fearing, Daily Record,
April 20, 1956 (Circuit Court of Baltimore City), which relied upon the
principal case and quoted it at length.
- 210 Md. 1, 121 A. 2d 812 (1956).
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it is a charitable institution.2 The trial court sustained a
demurrer to this action from which the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the demurrer was sustained; the statute does not
contemplate or permit a direct action against the insurer
by a tort claimant in advance of some determination of the
liability on the part of the insured.
This case is an attempt to recover in tort for harm
resulting from the conduct of a non-managerial employee
of a charitable institution. There have been several views
expressed by the courts of the United States regarding the
liability of charitable institutions for torts.' Of the lines of
reasoning advanced to support the immunity of charitable
institutions, Maryland and some other states adopted the
so-called trust fund theory,4 to the effect that since the
funds and property are held in trust and any awards made
for tort damage are outside the purposes designated in the
trust, that compensation to injured parties would be use of
funds for a purpose never intended by the settlor. This
reasoning assumes that the preservation of the charitable
trust is more desirable than giving compensation from such
funds for injury incurred by their use. The trust fund
theory was introduced in 1848 in England.5 In 1866, it was
repudiated." The theory was first adopted in the United
States by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
1876.' This court cited early English cases as authority but
did not mention the later cases that changed the law, which
indicated that the court probably was not cognizant of
them. If this view is followed unequivocally the result is
that damage to third parties having no connection with the
institution and resulting from the most irresponsible man-
agement can occur without liability.
2 Md. Code (1951), Art 48A, Sec. 82:
"Each policy issued to cover the liability of any charitable institution
for negligence or any other tort shall contain a provision to the effect
that the insurer shall be estopped from asserting, as a defense to any
claim covered by said policy, that such institution is immune from
liability on the ground that it is a charitable institution."
0 See 4 ScoTT, TRusTs (2nd ed., 1956), Se. 402-402.2, 2893.
' Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); Loeffler v. Trustees of
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917);
Liability of Charitable Corporations and Trusts for Their Torts, 5 Md. L.
Rev. 336 (1941) ; Dille v. St. Lukes Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S. W. 2d 615
(1946) ; Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S. W. 2d 548
(1953); Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837
(1944); Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328 (1951).
5 Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
For detail of this case in relation to its aftermath see annotation, 14 A. L. R.
572, 574, and comprehensive superseding annotation In 25 A. L. R. 2d 29.
0 Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. C. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
,McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
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Implied waiver is another theory which the courts have
used to bar recovery: the patient is presumed to have
waived the right to recovery by submitting to treatment or
care in the institution.8 This is obviously a fiction and the
lack of logic is most apparent when it is applied to the un-
conscious patient who must enter the institution for emer-
gency treatment. If we exempt this class of patients from
the rule, and allow third persons within that class who
have no connection with the institution to recover, we allow
results unjustifiably inconsistent.
Immunity has also been based on the idea that the doc-
trine of respondeat superior cannot apply to charities be-
cause they receive no benefit in the form of profits from
the efforts of their servants.' However, some proponents of
this view hold the charity liable if the trustees or the board
of directors themselves are negligent in failing to select
competent employees." To allow immunity on this theory
is to allow limited immunity so that the same wrong and
injury resulting from the activities of the charity may or
may not be the subject of a suit, depending merely upon
the culpability of the trustees.
Another view takes the position that it is against public
policy to hold the charitable institution liable,11 apparently
on the theory made explicit in some cases that it is better
to let one party suffer than to allow the general group of
beneficiaries to suffer.12 Of course, the individuals making
up the group would suffer in a very nominal amount and it
seems odd that an institution generally dedicated to benefit
a Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 855 (1906) ; Hospital of St.
Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. B. 18 (1914); Downs v.
Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894) ; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849 (1938) ; St. Vincent's
Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Bruce v. Young Men's
Christian Ass'n., 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798 (1929).
' Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n., 85 Oh. St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911);
Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914); Southern Methodist
University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S. W. 2d 749 (1943) ; Vermillion v.
Woman's College of Due West, 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649 (1916) ; Morrison
v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N. W. 173 (1916).
P0 Hoke v. Glen, ibid.
n Cook v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874
(1918) ; Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium and Benev. Ass'n., 92 Neb. 162,
137 N. W. 1120 (1912) ; Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital,
104 Oh. St. 61, 135 N. E. 287, 289, 23 A. L. R. 900 (1922) ; Weston's Adm'x. v.
Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Pa. 587, 107 S. E. 785, 792, 23 A. L. R.
907 (1921).
12 Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649,
650 (1916) ; Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. 2d 869,
872 (4th Cir., 1929).
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the public should be allowed to injure one of that group
and then turn him out without aid.'"
Another court has reasoned that charitable institutions
and trusts should be immune from liability because they
are performing a quasi-public duty; the institution is doing
something really governmental and immunity rests on
this. 4 It is hard to see the validity of this approach when
government itself has frequently accepted responsibility
for tort damage and the courts have made distinctions be-
tween governmental and proprietary powers.
There has been a strong trend in the United States to
do away with the charitable immunity doctrine. So many
different, inconsistent reasons have been advanced to allow
immunity that the whole doctrine seems like a huge, im-
perfect pot patched diligently by many ingenious tinners
but never quite made to hold water. Several states have
recently, by case law, departed from the various theories
to allow recovery now without immunity. 5 Some juris-
dictions were wiser and allowed full liability from the
beginning."
For a long time insurance played no part in the con-
sideration of the courts. Now, two jurisdictions put new
emphasis on the existence of liability insurance in favor of
the institution. 7 It is contended by the adherents of this
view that even though the injured party recovered, there
would be no detriment to the trust fund since recovery
could be had from the insurer. Therefore, those courts
allowed recovery limited to the amount of the insurance;
however, there are still many jurisdictions that hold that
liability insurance does not affect the rule. 8
18 See also 5 Md. L. Rev., supra, n. 4, 340.
"Schau v. Morgan, M.D., 241 Wis. 334,6 N. W. 2d 212 (1942).
5See for example: Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Oh. St. 467, 135
N. E. 2d 410 (1956) ; Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt.
124, 70 A. 2d 230, 25 A. L. R. 2d 1 (1950) ; Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital
Ass'n., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950) ; Noel v. Menninger Founda-
tion, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954) ; Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial
Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953) ; Ray v. Tucson
Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142, 25 A. L. R. 2d 12 (1951),
and annotation at p. 29.
"6 Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 7 Ter. (Del.) 350, 83 A. 2d 753 (1951);
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; Gable
v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940).
1. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanatarium Ass'n., 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.
2d 835, 133 A. L. R. 819 (1939), noted in 53 Harv. L. Rev. 873 (1940);
Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950).
1 Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N. W. 2d 86
(1955) ; Kreuger v. Schmiechen, 364 Mo. 568, 264 S. W. 2d 311 (1954);
Cristim v. Griffin Hospital, 134 Conn. 282, 57 A. 2d 262 (1948) ; Stedman v.
Jewish Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S. W. 2d 469 (1945) ;
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The trust fund theory of immunity of charitable institu-
tions to tort liability was first recognized in Maryland in
1885 when an inmate brought suit against the House of
Refuge for an assault upon him by an officer of the insti-
tution. 9 Another case went to the Court of Appeals in 1917
when a fireman was injured through the defective con-
dition of a fire escape and the court affirmed its prior
holding." No other important case arose until 1948 when,
following the adoption of the present statute requiring all
policies of insurance taken out by charitable institutions to
contain a clause estopping the insurer from asserting the
institution's immunity, a suit was brought against a Balti-
more Hospital for injury to one of its patients 1.2  The claim
was based in part on the theory that the injured party was
a paying patient, a factor not present in earlier cases, but
the Court did not accept this contention. In reaffirming the
earlier cases the Court reviewed the history of the im-
munity doctrine in Maryland. Another attempt to recover
was made when a patient was injured in a Prince George's
County Hospital. The Court in discussing the problem of
charitable immunity argued that in the absence of statute
even an insured charitable institution is not liable for
torts.22 However, insurance was not mentioned in this case
until the plaintiff asked for a new trial to bring it into
issue. The Court questioned:
"Should the Act of 1947 be strictly construed as
applicable only to a suit by the insured against the
insurer? Or is it, directly or indirectly, applicable in
a suit against the insured by a tort claimant, so as to
estop the insured (or the insurer as conducting the in-
sured's defense) to the extent of the collectible in-
surance?"2
There seems to be an implication in the present statute
that the Legislature intended to adjust the inequity result-
ing from the payment of insurance premiums by charities
Dille v. St. Lukes Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S. W. 2d 615 (1946) ; Meade
v. St. Francis Hospital of Charleston, 137 W. Va. 834, 74 S. E. 2d 405
(1953) ; DeGroot v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 10 N. W. 2d 907 (1943) ;
Woods v. Overlook Hospital Association, 6 N. J. Super. 47, 69 A. 2d 742
(1949); Enman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 170 N. E.
43 (1930) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940).
19 Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885).
"Loeffler v. Sheppard-Pratt Hosp., 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917).
21 Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d
574 (1948).
12 Thomas v. Prince George's County, 200 Md. 554, 92 A. 2d 452 (1952),
noted in 14 Md. L. Rev. 170 (1955).
" Ibid, 560.
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for which they receive nothing in return and to give relief
to parties suffering tortious damage from an insured charit-
able institution or its agent. However, the legislative pur-
pose is not clear and, therefore, perhaps the most significant
statement in the instant case is an obiter dictum in refer-
ence to the statute, in which the Court said:
"We think the Legislature had in mind the fact that
the insurer usually conducts the defense of the action
by the tort claimant against the insured, and to the ex-
tent of the collectible insurance, and to that extent
only, the insured is estopped from raising the defense
of immunity."24
This may indicate that they will answer the second of the
above questions in the affirmative.
Practical problems of pleading beset plaintiffs' attorneys
in this type of case, but, an acceptable solution has been
suggested. Judge Homey and Judge Niles have both writ-
ten opinions in which they set forth the pattern of plead-
ings that they feel is proper.2 They suggest that there be
an allegation in the declaration that "although the defen-
dant is a charitable institution it is not immune from suit".
Note that this allegation does not mention insurance. The
defendant may answer with a special plea that it is an
eleemosynary institution and not amenable to suit which
is the acceptable plea where there is no insurance. Then,
plaintiff may allege the existence of insurance by replica-
tion or, if necessary, make use of deposition and discovery
to determine the existence or amount of insurance and in-
corporate his findings in a claim for damages in an appro-
priately amended declaration. Finally, if the jury awards
damages in excess of the collectible insurance, the trial
court, on a motion for a new trial could require the plaintiff
to file a remittitur for the excess damages or grant a new
trial. Of course, in spite of the suggested approach, which
seems to anticipate any possible pitfalls and to avoid the
irregularities of pleading previously objected to, no one
can be certain whether the Court of Appeals will find it
acceptable.
The definitive solution to this irritating problem could,
and should, come from the Legislature. In its passage of
Section 82 of Article 48A it apparently recognized that any
reason which may have been given for allowing insured
Gorman v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 210 Md. 1, 7, 121 A. 2d 812 (1956).
Karr v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, Daily Record, May 1, 1953; Phillips v.
Epworth Methodist Church, Inc., Daily Record, March 18, 1955.
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charitable institutions total immunity from tort liability
has long since lost its force, that an imposition of liability,
at least where there is liability insurance, would not place
an undue burden on such institutions. Such an approach
is certainly in accord with a very strong and highly accept-
able national trend.26 A most effective arrangement would
be the repeal and re-enactment of Section 82 to provide
simply that any insured charitable institution is liable for
its torts, or the torts of its agents in the course of employ-
ment, to the extent of the amount of its insurance cov-
21erage. If this is done a great deal of litigation will become
unnecessary and a complex problem will be ended after
more than nine years of doubt and question. Or, it might be
desirable that the legislature should consider adoption of
the later view of the English courts and many American
jurisdictions that charitable institutions may be held re-
sponsible in tort (without regard to whether or not they
carry insurance against such liability).
CARL A. D.mKEE
Bidder's Right To Return Of Deposit From City After
Bidder's Refusal To Enter Into Written Contract
Because Of A Material Mistake In The Bid
Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Co.1
Plaintiff, DeLuca-Davis Construction Co., Inc., sub-
mitted a bid for certain construction work to be done for
the city of Baltimore. In accordance with Section 38 of
the Baltimore City Charter it submitted with its bid a
certified check for $50,000. After all the bids were opened
and announced by the Board of Estimates, plaintiff realized
that it had made a mistake, and it so notified the municipal
authorities before they had taken any action on the bids.
Plaintiff, at the trial, showed that it had made a clerical
error in transferring one particular estimated cost item
from its "detailed work sheet" to the "summary work
sheet". (Cost of unclassified excavation was erroneously
set down as $3.34 per yard instead of $13.34 per yard.)
'Supra, ns. 13, 14.
"It might be desirable for the Legislature to provide a direct action
against the insurer, as some states have done, either in a separate action
or by way of Joinder. See ARx. STAT. ANN. (Off. ed., 1947), Sec. 66-517
construed in Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 140
(W. D. Ark., 1950).
'210 Md. 518, 124 A. 2d 557 (1956).
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